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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HARRY CHILD, also known as
HENRY CHILD,
Pla~ntiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case
No. 8869

EUGENE A. CHILD and ARVILLA
CHILD, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

·COME now the defendants and appellants in the
above entitled action and jointly and severally respectfully petition the Court to grant a rehearing in the above
entitled cause for the reason and upon the ground that
in its Opinion heretofore written the Court erred in the
following particulars:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE IN SEVERAL MATERIAL PARTICULARS.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN THE BASIS OF ITS APPRAISAL
OF 'THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT BY FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF ·THE RESPONDENT'S CASE IS
CLEAR AND .CONVINCING AND IN AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.

I, the undersigned attorney for the appellants and
defendants herein, certify that in my opinion there is
merit to the foregoing claim and that the Court comInitted errors in the particulars above specified.

J. GRANT IVERSON
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THECOURTERREDINITSSTATEMENTOFTHEEV~

DENCE IN SEVERAL MATERIAL PARTICULARS.

The evidence in support of the Trial Court's findings
and judgment, a~ the evidence i~ stated to be in this
Court's Decision, is not clear and convincing. Tllis is
nwre apparent if ~eYeral errors in the stateinents of the
evidence are eorreeted.
ln reviewing the erueial evidenee,

thi~

Court stated:

.. Eugene's letter in repl~y i~ of critical importance *** llarry Child said that Hazel received
Eugene·~ an~wer to her letter and read it to him
• • • The undisputed faet is that Hazel withdrew
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the money from Eugene's account and gave it to
Harry, who took it to Mr. Warnock and had the
deed made out to himself. Later, on hi's own
initiative, he had a deed made from himself to
E1tgene and had it recorded." (Italics throughout
this brief are defendants)
The statement that Harry ·Child said that Hazel read
the letter to him is not correct.
The evidence of Harry Child on cross-examination
on this matter is as follows:
"Q. You didn't ever see the letter~
A. I never saw the letter." ( Tr. 23)
The evidence of Harry Child on direct examination
on this subject is as follows:
''A.

Oh, yes, she must have written to Eugene.
She apparently got word back that it was
O.K. I don't know. I never saw it." (Tr. 14)

There is no evidence to the effect that when Harry
took the money to Mr. Warnock he "had the deed made out
to himself and later, on his own initiative, had the deed
made to Eugene". The evidence is undisputed that on
April 16, 1945, Hazel drove with Harry to Salt Lake.
Harry testified:
"Yes, the only thing that riveted it in my
mind, of her giving the money, we drove in town
and I parked right there on First South,* * *T
remember I got out of the car before she would
give me that money* * *she would not give me the
money until she said, 'Will you put that property
in Eugene's name to secure the loan~'* * * I said,
'Absolutely, I will put the property in Eugene's
name to secure the loan." ( Tr. 15)
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Harry then took the money to :\1 r. Warnock, who
gave him the deed made out to I-Ienry Child, as grantee,
executed by l(athryn lone Griffith Rankin, as grantor,
dated April10, 1945 (six days before) and acknowledged
in California. (Exhibit No. 1) He immediately rejoined
Hazel. She asked for the deed. He told her it was made
out in his name and he would have to have the deed
made out from himself to Eugene, because he had proInised that he would do so. (Tr. 16-17)
They imn1ediately went to the office of a friend of
Harry's, Albert Toronto, and there n1ade out a deed
(Exhibit No. 2), bearing the date of April 16, 1945,
executed by Henry Child and Hazel _jiarie Child, as
grantors, to Eugene A. Child, as grantee.
These, with other errors in statement of the evidence
cannot but raise a question as to "\Yhether the evidence
as appraised by the Court was taken fron1 he Briefs of
counsel or fr01n the record. There were so many misstatements and false assun1ptions and inferences in respondent's Brief that appellant in his Reply Brief, Point
IV, called attention to eleven such 1natters of significant
importance.
In a case such a~ thi~. the original transcript of the
evidence is of indispensable i1nportanee. It is for that
reason that the appellant throughout his Briefs has
quoted verbatin1 the eritleal eYidence. The transcript of
evidenee in thi~ mattPr alont' reflects the true state of the
evidenee.
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Another important statement made by the Court
in its Decision is :
"Notwithstanding Eugene's claim that his
father, Harry, purchased the property solely for
him, neither Eugene nor his mother, Hazel, who
was on his side supporting him in the controversy,
claim that he ever expressly stated that he would
do so. Such result would have to be made out of
the letter) which she failed to produce and which
they claim stated that Eugene would not loan
money to his father but the purchase would have
to be made for himself." (page 2, Decision of the
Court)
Is it unusual that Harry and Eugene failed to produce a letter written in April 1945 at the trial held June
14, 1957? The 11 years delay in bringing this case to trial
after the date of the deed points up the laches of Harry
Child in failing to bring this action until 1956, when such
important evidence could not be expected to be produced.
Coming back to the statement, "such result would
have to be made out of the letter". There was much evidence from which, it appears that Harry knew that
Eugene and Hazel would not and did not let Harry use
$300.00 of Eugene's money for any other purpose than
to buy the land for Eugene. The following are smne items
of evidence to this point:
Brandt Child testified that the day the letter was
received he was in the kitchen when Harry entered with
the letter from Eugene in one hand and the envelope in
the other hand, and he heard his father and mother dis-
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cuss the contents of the letter. He stated, "Yes, I remember mother saying, 'Why don't you sell some cows and
buy it yourself1'" (Tr. 72).
Hazel Chld testified: "I took the letter and read it
and I read it back to him and Gene said, 'I don't want
to loan Dad the money, but if he don't buy the land, I
would like to buy the land, if you think it is a good
proposition'." (Tr. 40).
Also she testified, "l said, you see, if Gene buys the
land, it will be Gene's. If you want the land, you had
better buy the land yourself, sell two cows." (Tr. 40).
He refused to sell two cows. As he testified, "She
told me to sell cows to get the property, but a couple of
cows wouldn't have brought enough money to buy the
property or pay the balance and not only that, I didn !t
have any cows that I wanted to sell. That u·as part of my
plan." (Tr. 24)
In other words, the eows were n1ore in1portant to him
than the land.
Also, Hazel testified : .. I told hi1n, I said, •you should
have bought that land yourself. It was a good proposition.
You should have bought that land yourself, but it is
Gene's'. Everytiine we had any eonversation, I said, 'It's
Gene's, you let hi1n buy it'.'' (Tr. 43)
The truth of the aboYP state1uent is confirn1ed by the
actions of Hazel and Harry when they were divorced in
1955, before this action was sta rtrd. They Inade a Ininute
division of property. The land in question was then worth
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$40,000 to $50,000-more than all other assets of the parties. She made no claim to any part of the property in
question which she certainly would haye done if he owned
it subject to a $300.00 mortgage to Eugene. He made no
representation that the property in question was his.
Since the basic problem is the intention of the parties
at the time the deed was made, this evidence is of the
utmost in1portance.
Also, on cross-examination, Hazel testified: "Mr.
child didn't borrow the money. Eugene bought the propf'rty." (Tr. 63)
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN THE BASIS OF ITS APPRAISAL
OF 'THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.

The Court stated at page 4 of the Decision, "The
fundamental consideration is that there is nothing incredible or unnatural about Harry Child's contention
that inasmuch as he conceived the idea of acquiring this
property and nourished it for several years, finally
overcoming the obstacles encountered in getting it, he
did not agree to forego all interest in it himself and
purchase it for Eugene."
For Harry to prevail in this matter, the evidence
must be clear and convincing that Eugene intended that
his money be used as and for a loan and that the deed
should be a mortgage to secure such loan. It is not enough
that Harry did so intend.
The appellant will discuss the evidence on this
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matter hereafter.
The law is plain that in such a situation as this, for
one to prevail who attempts to establish that a written
conveyance was something other than it purported to be,
he must prove that both parties to the instrument intended that it should be something other than it on its face
showed it to be.
The law in this matter was laid down in Corey vs.
Roberts, 82 rtah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. We quote from said
case as follows:
"It is likewise the law, where conveyances
clear, unmnbiguous and unequivocal in their
terms, are attacked by parol evidence seeking to
establish a trust or give to the documents a mortgage construction, the party so seeking n1ust by
clear, unequivocal and satisfactory proof establish
the alleged trust or mortgage relationship.
,..

:If:

,..

"Plaintiff concedes that, to establish any
other relationship, she n1ust show by proof meeting the standard required by the courts that the
defendant was not a purchaser, but a nwrtgagee
or trustee, or both, and that the deed was security
for the debt owing by the plaintiff to the defendant. Plaintiff also accepts the position that the
proof n1ust sho\\- that both grantor and grantee
understood that the eonYeyance was made as securitY for the debt and not an ah~olute convey
ance.' If plaintiff fails to n1eet these conditions
and burdens of proof her action n1ust fail."
This ~tate1nent of the law was rea.ffinned in S orthcrest,
Inc. vs. Jflalkcr Bank and Trust Co., et al, 1:22 Utah 268,
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matter hereafter.
The law is plain that in such a situation as this, for
one to prevail who attempts to establish that a written
conveyance was something other than it purported to be,
he must prove that both parties to the instrument intended that it should be something other than it on its face
showed it to be.
The law in this matter was laid down in Corey vs.
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. We quote from said
case as follows:
"It is likewise the law, where conveyances
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establish a trust or give to the documents a mortgage construction, the party so seeking 1nust by
clear, unequivocal and satisfactory proof establish
the alleged trust or n1ortgage relationship.
* • *
"Plaintiff concedes that, to establish any
other relationship, she Inust show by proof meeting the standard required by the courts that the
defendant wa8 not a purchaser, but a mortgagee
or trustee, or both. and that the deed was security
for the debt owing by the plaintiff to the defendant. Plaintiff also aceepts the position that the
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:2-l-8 P. :2d 692. The statement of the Court is as follows:

"Undisputed is the plaintiff's contention that
one who asserts the invalidity of a deed must so
prove by clear and convincing evidence. Thornley
Livestock Co. vs. Gailey, 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d
283; Corey vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940
* * *. Plaintiff maintains further that whether an
instrument is a deed or mortgage is a matter of intention of the parties and it must appear not only
that one but both parties, regarded it as a mortgage before it is so legally. There is no doubt that
this is so. 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, Section 132**. ''
In the case of Gibbons 1;s. Gibbons, 103
135 P. 2d 105, the Court stated:

l~tah

266,

''The controlling question was what was the
intention of the parties as it existed at the time
of the execution and delivery of the instrument~"
As the Court said in Beeler vs. American Trust
Company, 147 P. 2d 583, 24 Cal. 2d 1,
''The burden was on the plaintiff to prove
that it was highly probable that the deed was not
what it purported to be. He did not sustain this
burden by evidence that at best is simply consistent with the deed's being something else, but
which is just as consistent with being what it purports to be.''
This statement is applicable to the evidence in this case.
The evidence will be considered under the next point.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT BY FINDING THAT THE EVI-
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DENCE IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT'S CASE IS
CLEAR AND ·CONVINCING AND IN AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.

Considering the evidence upon the question of
whether Eugene considered the deed a mortgage, the following is pertinent:

'' Q.

~Ir. Child, have you ever considered at any
time that the $300.00 you gave in 1945 was a
loan secured by a mortgage on that property~

A. No.
Q. And the deed which was delivered to you by
your father and mother was not, I take it
then, in your mind a n1ortgage ?

A. Absolutely not.
Q.

It was an absolute conveyance of title to
youf

.A..

That has always been 1ny mind.

Q.

And in the discussion \\ith your father, have
you ever indicated any other understanding1
Have you ever indicated anything else other
than thai when you have discussed the matter with your fathert

A.

Just discussing the land is the only thing
that has ever been discussed is that it's my
land.''
(Tr. 88, 89)

It would be repititious to again discuss the contents of the
letters testified to by Eugene and Hazel and the testimony of Brandt Child that despite the fact that Harry
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Child stated that he had never seen the letter he was present when Harry Child and Hazel Child discussed the
letter and at the conclusion of the discussion Hazel said
to Harry: "Why don't you sell some cows and buy it
yourself~" (Tr.72)
Eugene has always treated the property as his own,
as evidenced by the following:

1. He has paid the taxes for the last ten years
at least. (Tr. 84)
2. He has never asked his father for the repayment
of $300.00 or any sum. (Tr. 84)
3. His father has never offered to pay the $300 to
Eugene. (Tr. 84)

4. He rernoved top soil from the land, but did not
secure his father's consent to its removal. (Tr. 84)

5. He mortgaged the property to Bountiful State
Bank in ~I arch of 1953 for $3,500. ('Tr. 85)
6, He mortgaged the property to Earl Burnham
in 1955 for $4,000 (Tr. 85)
7.

He sold one-half acre to the Government. (Tr. 85)

8. He deeded a piece of the land to Harold Calder.
(Tr. 87)

9. He made a contract with Harold Calder, who wa8
opening up a subdivision on the south of the land in
question, for a road for the center of the road to go up the
property so he, Eugene, could take advantage to open up
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some land there and Mr. Calder could open up some land
on the other side. ( Tr. 87)
10. His father had nothing to do with either the sale
of the land to the Government or the deal with :Mr. Calder. (Tr. 87)
11. He was sure that his father knew about the
Government transaction, but Eugene didn't know whether
Harry knew about the deal with Mr. Calder. He didn't
mention it to him. He didn't see any reason to. (Tr. 88)
12. He refused to let his father put a reservoir on
the land, although he wanted to do so. (Tr. 88, 97)
13. Mr. Ashdown, a neighbor, at the time he removed
top soil from his, .Mr. Ashdown's land, asked permission
of Eugene to go across the land in question. (Tr. 94)
Is it credible to conclude in the light of this evidence
that the evidence is clear, unequivocal and convincing
that Eugene thought the deed was a security for a loan J
The principles and rules of law are laid down to help
effect justice. One of these rules is that property which
has been deeded to a grantee shall not be taken away
frmn hi1n except upon clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence. For 12 years Eugene has thought the property
was his. He has treated it as his. Others have loaned
hi1n money on the :"ecurity of the land. Others have purchased parts of the land and haYe sought his permission
to haul soil across the land. During tlris long period
of tilne, could all third parties dealing with Harry and
Eugene be 1nistaken as to who owned the land 1 If Harry
had thought that the land was his, could he have kept
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it a secret from 80 many people for so long a time? Is
Eugene now deprived of the land on the oral, hearsay,
incompetent statement of Harry Child that Hazel Child
told him that in a letter Eugene had said she could lend
Harry the money, and this despite the testimony of
Eugene and Hazel concerning the contents of the letter
that was received in reply? And despite the testimony of
Hazel and Brandt that Harry received the letter and took
it to the home where it was discussed at length, although
Harry denied ever seeing the letter, and despite the
testimony of Brandt that after they had discussed the
letter Hazel said to Harry, '' \Vhy don't you sell so1ne
cows and buy it yourself~" (Tr. 72)

It appears to the defendants that the evidence outlined above is quantitatively and qualitatively greater
than the evidence adduced by the plaintiff.
Let us briefly discuss some of the inferences made
by the Court on the evidence. At page 1 of the Decision,
the Court observed that Hazel did not share Harry's enthusiasm for buying the property. This inference is not
supported by the evidence, as Hazel testified :

"Q. Did you say in that letter that purchase of
that land was a good proposition?
Yes. I thought it was. That's the reason I
tried to get Mr. Child to buy it.''
(Tr. 55-56)
A.

It is true that she told him to sell some of his cows to
raise the money. The transcript is filled with evidence
by Hazel, Brandt and Eugene as to the difficulties the
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family had encountered because of !-larry's failure to
properly confine his cows. She had good reason not to
turn over the water stock which she had received from
Harry's sister when she paid off a note to him. She, by
her own labor had earned and saved $600.00 to pay off the
note when Harry refused to repay his sister a loan ·which
was long, past due. (Tr. 37-38) She apparently did not
care to go to work again and save money to pay off
another loan for Harry or probably lose the water stock,
if she did not.
This Court stated: "It was he (Harry) who conceived
the original idea of purchasing this property and nourished it to fruition* * * They do not point out what
Harry Child was to gain by turning over his favorable
option to Eugene. In carrying out the details of the
transaction and doing all the work on the property he
did all for the benefit of a son whom they now claim at
the age 17 did not trust his own father and declared he
would not loan hi1n n1oney. If Eugene is to prevail, it
must be on the basis that he was that kind of a son, but
his father benignly overlooked the rebuff and in spite
of it put in several years tilne and effort to see that
Eugene got the sole benefit of the property."
The inference frmu this state1nent is that Harry had
an intense desire to purchase the land which persisted
for ~·ear~ and that he expended great effort in acquiring and many ~·ears in in1proving the property. The
evidence is that in 1941 and 19-t-2 he ·wanted the land
because it had a hollo'v running up through it in which
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he might impound water. He did not in any of his testimony state that he wanted to purchase the property as
an investment. "I wanted to put a reservoir up there
for one thing and store a lot of water that was going to
waste* * * Also I could use the land to pasture my cows".
(Tr. 7.) He checked the records at Fannington and
learned that Mrs. Griffith owned the land. He wrote
to her in California. He heard from Mr. Warnock, her
agent in Salt Lake City. He offered :Mr. Warnock $300.00.
(Tr. 8) :Nir. Warnock told Harry he didn't think she
would accept it. In 1945 he leaned that Mrs. Griffith
had died. He again offered $300.00 to Mr. Warnock. His
offer was accepted. (Tr. 11) He paid $25.00 and went
about raising the $275.00 balance. He got $300.00 fron1
Hazel and took it to Mr. "\Varnock and received the deed.
He staked some cows and horses on the land. In 1950
and 1951 he spent $200.00 plus approximately $100.00 for
rental of trucks in putting a fence around it. (Tr. 116)
This is the total amount spent in "improving" the land
in eleven years. In fact, in that area a fence was no real
improvement.
Harry gained 1nuch more than he spent on the property by buying it for Eugene. On this subject, Eugene
testified as follows:

'' Q.

Counsel asked you if you ever reimbursed
your father for the fence he put on your
property. Do you want to make an explanation to the answer you made?

A.

Well, he asked me if I ever reimbursed him
in cash for it. I figured his reimbursement
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come in the fact that he was putting cows
on my piece of land up there and he had been
paying in years past hundreds of dollars for
pasture land.''
There is no evidence that ''all the work he did on the
property," which was only putting on a fence at a cost
of $200 to $300, was "for the benefit of a son whom they
now claim at 17 did not trust his father." Let us examine
this statement. The fence was no benefit to Eugene, except as it benefited the whole fanrily by keeping Harry's
cows away frmn neighbors' gardens and lawns and thus
embarrassing the family. It does not enhance the value
of the property.
The defendants do not clain1 that Eugene did not
trust his father. The evidence on this point is as follows:

'' Q.

Did you ever have any reason to think if
you loaned your Dad money you would never
get it back'

A.

Frmn the past dealings, it ·wasn't so much
that he V{ouldn 't pay it back. I wouldn't
doubt for a 1ninute that he "\vouldn't pay it
back if he had it, but he just put everything
in the eow~ and neYer had it to pay back to
anybody.

Q.

But you knew if you asked the jury you could
get it back, didn't you?

Not necessarily. I had ju~t as soon not even
borrow it. I bought the land.·'
(Tr. 98)
A.

The plaintiff does not attempt to contradict the
tP~tinwny of Hazel that Harry "\Vouldn 't or couldn't, pay
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the $600.00 he had o·wed his sister for years. Hazel testified that after the sister had repeatedly asked for the
money, Harry would say that she didn't need it. Hazel
finally worked and saved enough to pay it herself. (Tr.
37, 38) These things were no doubt well known to Eugene.
Money loaned and not repaid is a source of friction.
As Shakespeare said through his character, Polonius:
"Neither a borrower nor a lender be, for a loan oft loses
both itself and friend and borrowing dulls the edge of
husbandry". Was Eugene \:vrong in following this advice 1
That Harry's credit was not good at the time is obvious. He very apparently couldn't borrow $275.00 unsecured. The only collateral, except some 20 cows, he
had, was the water stock Hazel was holding, which
we have discussed above. The only available source of
money was his cows. This fact and his attitude towards
selling the cows, from his own testimony, is a key to the
whole situation. The defendants urge the Court to give
consideration to the testimony, not only of Hazel and Eugene and Brandt, but of Harry himself on this point.
At the expense of being repetitious, the defendants submit
the following testimony of Harry:

'' Q.

Do you have a recollection of the very day
you bought that property Mrs. Child told you
to go and sell a couple of cows and get the
money if ~;ou wanted to buy that property 1

A.

She told me to go and sell cows to get the
property, but a couple of cows wouldn't have
brought enough money to buy the property
or pay the balance, and not only that, I
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didn't have any cows that I wanted to sell.
That was part of my plan.
(Tr. 24)

On direct examination, Harry testified as follows:

'' Q.

And did you agree then to sell some cows
to raise the money 1

A.

No, I did not, because that was part of
my, the cows were part of my program."

This testimony points up the fact that Harry had no
intense desire to purchase this property, particularly
if it necessitated selling a couple of cows.
Another important statement in the Opinion is the
following: "Consistent with Harry Child's claims and the
findings of the trial court are the undisputed facts that
he "·ent into possession of the property* * *and has at
all times remained in possession and exercised general
dominion over it".
As to this point, the defendants in their Reply Brief
(at pages 19-23) discussed the 1natter of what constitutes
possession and quoted the law, citing l\Tatio11al Cypress
Pole & Pilillg Co. Y. Hemphill Lumber Co., 325 :\Io. 807,
31 S.\V. 2d 1059, 1063, as follows:
''Possession of land has been defined as the
actual control by physical occupation and the
holding .and exercising dmuinion over it; that
position or relation which giYes one its use and
control and exrludes all others frmn like use or
control."
ll nder this definition, Harry Child did not have possession of thP propprt~·. _He had only permissiYe use therof.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
\Vithout going into deail, defendants call attention to the
facts delineated in their Brief, which were si1nply these:
1. Harry wanted to purchase the property for
the purpose of putting a reservoir thereon. Eugene refused to let him build a reservoir thereon.

2. Eugene removed top soil, for which he received $500.00 or $600.00, no part of which Harry
ever claimed until the Complaint in this case was
filed.
3. \Vhen ~1r. Ashdown desired to remove top
soil from his property, it was Eugene and not
Harry to whom he made application for the right
to cross the property. If Harry had been in possession and exercising general dominion over the
property, this would not have happened.
4. Harold Calder obtained a part of the property.
5, Bountiful State Bank and Earl Burnham
loaned Eugene money on the property.
6. The \\" eber River Project purchased part of
the property from Eugene.
7. Eugene paid all the taxes for 10 years. Harry
never offered to pay the taxes.
8.

Harry never offered to pay $300.00 to Eugene.

Merely pasturing his cows on the property, while Eugene
dealt with all third parties, many of them neighbors
living in the immediate vicinity, indicates that no one
considered that Harry was in possession and exercising
general dominion over the land.
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Defendants appreciate the fact that there is some
difficulty in detennining what is clear and convincing
evidence under the rules laid down for so determining.
:However, defendants desire to cite what apparently has
become the rule in Utah and contrast it with the evidence
in this matter. In Chambers vs. E1nery, 45 P. 192, 13 l'tah
37 4, the Court said :
''So, in IIowland v. Blake, 97 U.S. 624, the
Supreme Court, speaking through ~Ir. Justice
Hunt, said: 'In each case the burden rests upon
the moving party of overcoming the strong presumption arising from the terms of a written
instrument. If the proofs are doubtful and unsatisfactory, if there is a failure to overcome this
presumption, entirely plain and convincing beyond reasonable controversy, the writing ·will be
held to express correctly the intention of the
parties.' Citing 1 Story Eq. Jur., Sec. 157; Porn.
Eq. J ur., Sec. 1040, and several U. S. and State
Court decisions.''
In Jensen vs. Howell, 282 P. 103-1, 75 rtah 6-1, .Jir. Justice
Straup haid down the rule as follows :
··In such ea~e~ (equity rases) on appeal and
a review on questions of both law and fact and on
the challenge of findings, the reYiew in effect is
a trial de novo on the record. On such a review,
if, after 1naking due allowance a~ to the better
opportunity of the trial court to observe the derne.anor of the wi tne~se~. or detennining their
credibility and the weight of their evidence, we on
the rerord neYerthPll'~~ are persuaded that a challenged finding i:::; against the fair preponderance
or n T<'a tPr Wt'~ ~~·h t of the evidenre or not sup,ported
h~· it. we disapprove it and n1ake or direct a fiind0

~
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ing, or remand the case for further proceedings;
otherwise we .affirm it.''
In Sine v. Harper, 222 P. 2d 571, 118 Utah 415, Mr.
Justice Latimer stated:
"The Court below determined that the evidence was sufficiently clear and convincing to
satisfy his mind beyond a reasonable doubt that a
mutual mistake of fact existed. We are, therefore,
compelled to analyze the evidence and detern1ine
whether it is sufficient from the standpoint oi
quality and quantity to sustain the findings of
the Trial Judge. vVhile the terms 'clear and convincing' are relative and are not capable of measurement, they carry an element of certainty. Mr.
Justice Wolfe, in the c.ase of Greener v. Greener
(Utah) 212 P.2d 194, 204, defines 'clear and convincing' in a very appropriate way. In that opinion he distinguishes between the phrases 'preponderance of the evidence' and 'clear and convincing evidence' in the following language:
"'* * * that proof is convincing which carries
with it, not only the power to persuade the mind
as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact
it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only
probable '"' ''' ':f. but for a matter to be clear and
convincing to a particular mind it must h.ave
reached the point where there remains no serious
or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that
it was convinced and yet which entertained not
a slight but .a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state
of confusion.'
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In the same case, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Wolf stated:
"The thought I am anxious to emphasize is
that while we take into consideration the advantaged position of the fact finder in that he views
the live scene as against our reading the dead
record, there must also be a factor allowed for
differences we may except in reasonable minds.
We cannot set up our conclusions as being the
only ones which reasonable minds could arrive at,
even had we the advantage of the imponderables.
"In other words, the degree of proof which
requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence in order to conclude for or against a certain
issue is of i1nportance and should be observed.
It is used where one is charged with fraud because a party should not be stigmatized with fraud
b~· a simple preponderance of evidence ; in cases
where it is necessary to set aside a release or a
contract because of claimed fraud or mutual mistake of fact: in cases where reforn1 of a contract
is asked to cmnport with what is clain1ed to express the alleged real intent of the parties at the
tin1e the contract was 1nade: in those cases where
the courts are asked to do smnething which will
change the situation frmn that which on the surface appears to be, where the parties have placed
then1selves or \\·here the situation should remain
a~ it 0xists, unless the court is n1orally convinced
that justice requires that it be altered, and in
other cases where public policy requires that
status be not disturbed until the proof goes be~·ond a mere or fair preponderance.
''But there are degrees of proof between evidence which nwrely or barely preponderates and
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ing, or remand the case for further proceedings;
otherwise we affirm it.''
In Sine v. Harper, 222 P. 2d 571, 118 Utah 415, Mr.
Justice Latimer stated:
''The Court below determined that the evidence was sufficiently clear and convincing to
satisfy his mind beyond a reasonable doubt that a
mutual mistake of fact existed. We are, therefore,
compelled to analyze the evidence and determine
whether it is sufficient from the standpoint of
quality and quantity to sustain the findings of
the Trial Judge. While the terms 'clear and convincing' are relative and are not capable of measurement, they carry an element of certainty. Mr.
Justice vV olfe, in the case of Greener v. Greener
(Utah) 212 P.2d 194, 204, defines 'clear and convincing' in a very appropriate way. In that opinion he distinguishes between the phrases 'preponderance of the evidence' and 'clear and convincing evidence' in the following language:
"'* * * that proof is convincing which carries
with it, not only the power to persuade the mind
as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact
it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only
probable #., "' '" but for a matter to be clear and
convincing to a particular mind it must have
reached the point where there remains no serious
or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that
it was convinced and yet which entertained not
a slight but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state
of confusion.'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
In the same case, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Wolf stated :
"The thought I am anxious to emphasize is
that while we take into consideration the advantaged position of the fact finder in that he views
the live scene as against our reading the dead
record, there must also be a factor allowed for
differences we may except in reasonable minds.
We cannot set up our conclusions as being the
only ones which reasonable minds could arrive at,
even had we the advantage of the imponderables.
"In other words, the degree of proof which
requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence in order to conclude for or against a certain
issue is of importance and should be observed.
It is used where one is charged with fraud because a p.arty should not be stigmatized with fraud
by a sirnple preponderance of evidence; in cases
where it is necessary to set aside a release or a
contract because of claimed fraud or mutual mistake of fact~ in cases where reforn1 of a contract
is asked to comport with what is clain1ed to express the alleged real intent of the parties at the
time the contract was rnade; in those cases where
the courts are asked to do sornething which will
change the situation froru that which on the surface appears to be, where the parties have placed
themselves or where the situation should remain
as it exif'ts. unless the court is n1orally convinced
that justiee requires that it be altered, .and in
other rases where public policy requires that
status be not disturbed until the proof goes berond a rnere or fair preponderance.
''But there are degrees of proof between evidence which rnerely or barely preponderates and
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where it preponderates to a convincing degree just
as there may be degrees between that evidence
which convinces and that which proves a fact to
a certainty. Evidence may be such as to create
a definite probability that a conclusion is correct,
but not reaching convincingness, it may have
passed the point of equipoise and also the point
of bare or 1nere preponderance and reached a
point of definite probability, but may not have
reached the point of conviction. I have taken occasion to deal at some length on these degrees of
proof, because there is an increasing tendency to
ignore them and put all proof on a flat plane of
mere preponderance and this sort of result may be
accomplished by the legerdemain of telling ourselves as reviewers that if it is convincing to a
trial judge, regardless of how it appears to us,
we should accept it as convincing to us. I do not
go that far. I think such reasoning is definitely on
the side of retrogression.''
Invoking the standards set forth in the above cases,
the defendants submit that the evidence as set forth in
the transcript cannot reach a degree that is clear, unequivocal and convincing that Eugene considered the deed
a mortgage. We have delineated the evidence as to Eugene's intent above. The evidence counter thereto is,
primarily, the statements of Harry Child. Uncorroborated, his evidence is weak and inconclusive. On the critical matter of the contents of the letter, he is contradicted
by Hazel, Eugene and Brandt. True, the matter of weight
is not a matter of "counting noses,'' but there comes
a point when the number opposed to one witness certainly
must carry some weight. If the three witnesses mentioned
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gave any evidence of dishonesty in their evidence, the
Court would be justified in disregarding their testimony.
But as set forth at length in appellants' Reply Brief,
their testimony is more straightforward, consistent and
should be more convincing than Harry's testimony. He
stands alone and uncorroborated. The fact that he is an
interested witness who stands to gain $50,000 for something for which he has paid nothing seriously impairs the
validity of his testimony. His testimony is contradictory
in several respects, as set forth in said Reply Brief
When he was divorced from his wife neither she nor he
claimed the property belonged to Harry. He certainly
knew, over the period of 12 years, that Eugene was dealing with the property, as the evidence now shows. It is
inconceivable that living near Eugene and near to the
property every day during that period he was so unaware
of what was transpiring as he would have us believe. He
made no claim to the money for the top soil and he made
no claim to any part of the nwney received from the
sale of the land to the Govern1nent. He never offered to
pay the $300.00 to Eugene and he paid no taxes.
There is one fact which is the key to Harry's actions,
a statement, which is not denied by Harry Child, in :Mr.
Toronto's office when the deed was 1nade frmn Harry
and Hazel to Eugene. The following is the testimony:
"Q. "\Vhile you were in ~Ir. Toronto's office. did
i\Lr. Cl{ild say anything about what he would
do after Gene c.a1ue hmne if the property
was in Gene's na1ne?
A. He said, ·l-Ie's just a kid, he doesn't know
what he is talking about and I'll settle with
hi1n when he emnes hmue.' ·
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It is apparent that Harry Child would not sell cows
to buy the property and he knew that it was the intention
of Hazel and Eugene that the deed should be an absolute
conveyance. He took his chance, that when Eugene came
back he could talk him into deeding the property back.
This was not an unreasonable anticipation, because the
property was not worth any considerable amount in excess of the price Eugene paid for it, $300.00. However,
Eugene did not care to sell the property. He had bought it
on the premise that it was a good investment. As he
stated in his letter to his mother, he would buy the property if she thought it was a good investment. Harry
never testified that he purchased the property as an
investment. He wanted the land to build a reservoir
thereon and to stake some cows thereon. Circumstances
have given the property a great value as Eugene had
hoped when he purchased it. Harry has had the benefit
of the use of the land to stake his cows on, if not to build
a reservoir thereon for 13 years.

Whether the transaction is considered an equitable
mortgage or a trust relationship if it involves the lending
of money and the giving of a deed as security the burden
is on the one asserting that the deed is not an absolute
conveyance to establish "that both grantor and grantee
understood that the conveyance was made as security for
the debt and not as an abi::Jolute conveyance. If plaintiff
fails to meet these conditions and burdens of proof her
action must fail." Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.
2d 940.
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The Court in its decision states that "It is not to be
gainsaid that there is evidence which can be viewed as
pointing both ways on this critical issue in dispute:
"whether the deed from Harry Child conveyed full fee
ownership to his son Eugene or only placed title in him to
secure payment of the money he advanced his father to
purchase the property." In other words, was this a
security transaction~ Thus the question can only be, was
this an equitable mortgage transaction~ Plaintiff in his
brief concedes that the trial court did not find an equitable mortgage established by the evidence. As plaintiff
said at pages 1 and 2 of his brief attacking points I and II
of appellant's brief, which were a discussion of the evidence upon the basis of an equitable mortgage relationship: "fruitless and pointless in connection with the
present appellant proceedings inasn1uch as there is no
finding anywhere in the record nor any conclusion of
law that the deed conveying title to property 'A' constitutes an equitable 1nortgage. The Court will notice that
plaintiffs' theory of equitable n1ortgage was pleaded
under the first cause of action of his cmnplaint, but that
the Trial Court, by n1inute entry (R. 1:2) expressly found
the issues in favor of plaintiff under the Second ·Cause of
Action and issued judg1nent tl1ereon. ''
"We, therefore, suggest tl1at appellants' argument
under their Points I and II pertaining to equitable mortgage is irrelevant and i1n1naterial to the ease before the
Court and should be disregarded.''
Thus it appears that the plaintiff eoneedes that his
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proof does not establish an equitable mortgage and
agrees with the statement rnade in appellants' brief that
the trial court did not believe that the evidence established an equitable mortgage or that both respondent and
appellants intended the deed to be a mortgage.
Thus, the basis of this Court's decision IS not in
accord with the theory of the respondent or the respondent's interpretation of the Trial Court's decision.

CONCLUSION
Measured by the rules set forth above for determining clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, the defendants submit that the record is wholly wanting in
evidence sufficient to support the judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and respectifully requests the Court to
grant a rehearing of this matter.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
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